Dynamic Quantized Consensus of General Linear Multi-agent Systems under
  Denial-of-Service Attacks by Feng, Shuai & Ishii, Hideaki
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
13
81
5v
2 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  3
0 A
pr
 20
20
1
Dynamic Quantized Consensus of General Linear
Multi-agent Systems under Denial-of-Service Attacks
Shuai Feng, Hideaki Ishii
Abstract—In this paper, we study multi-agent consensus prob-
lems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks with data rate con-
straints. We first consider the leaderless consensus problem and
after that we briefly present the analysis of leader-follower
consensus. The dynamics of the agents take general forms
modeled as homogeneous linear time-invariant systems. In our
analysis, we derive lower bounds on the data rate for the multi-
agent systems to achieve leaderless and leader-follower consensus
in the presence of DoS attacks without quantizer saturation. The
main contribution of the paper is the characterization of the
trade-off between the tolerable DoS attack levels for leaderless
and leader-follower consensus and the required data rates for the
quantizers during the communication attempts among the agents.
To mitigate the influence of DoS attacks, we employ dynamic
quantization with zooming-in and zooming-out capabilities for
avoiding quantizer saturation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the control of multi-agent systems
has attracted substantial attention due to the progress of
technologies in communication and computation areas, and
some of the key applications can be found in formation control,
control of large-scale systems and distributed sensor networks
[1]. In particular, nowadays a closed-loop control system inte-
grates sensors, computers and communication devices, which
complies with the concept of cyber-physical systems (CPSs).
While the industry notably benefits from the technology bloom
in CPSs, a challenging situation also emerges along with
the benefits due to malicious cyber attacks on CPSs such as
deceptive attacks and Denial-of-Service (DoS) [2], [3].
This paper deals with DoS attacks, which induce packet
drops maliciously and hence corrupt the availability of data.
The communication failures induced by DoS can exhibit a
temporal profile quite different from those caused by genuine
packet losses due to network congestion; particularly packet
dropouts resulting from malicious DoS need not follow a
given class of probability distributions [4], and therefore the
analysis techniques relying on probabilistic arguments may
not be applicable. This poses new challenges in theoretical
analysis and controller design.
In this paper, our focus is on the effects of DoS attacks
on multi-agent systems. Recently, systems under such attacks
have been studied from a control-theoretic viewpoint [5]–[15].
In [5], a framework is introduced where DoS attacks are
characterized by their levels of frequency and duration. There,
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they derived an explicit characterization of DoS frequency and
duration under which stability can be preserved through state-
feedback control. For multi-agent systems under DoS, there
are some recent results for consensus problems with infinite
data-rate communication. For example, the paper [14] presents
theoretical as well as comprehensive simulation studies for
continuous-time system consensus under DoS attacks with the
utilization of event-triggered control.
Even without attacks, real-time data exchanged within
networked control systems may suffer from communication
constraints. In particular, we address issues arising from con-
straints on data rate that can occur in multi-agent systems.
Such a constraint can be modeled by introducing quantization
with a finite number of discrete outputs. Centralized control
systems under quantized communication have been extensively
studied in the last two decades, for example by the seminal
papers [16]–[18] and the book [19]. The results in such
works show that insufficient bit rate in communication channel
influences the stability of a networked control system. The
paper [8] extended these results to the case with DoS attacks.
In the last decade, quantized consensus problems of multi-
agent systems have been broadly studied [20]–[26] and some
of them take data rate constraints into considerations. Also, the
related problem of quantized resilient consensus is studied in
[27], [28] where some agents are malicious and may prevent
consensus to take place. The part of leaderless consensus of
our paper is partially inspired by the quantized control of
multi-agent systems in the work [23].
More specifically in this paper, we address three issues
related to the joint effects of DoS attacks and data rate con-
straints for both the leaderless and leader-follower consensus
problems: (i) For the dynamic quantization, when the global
information of agent states is not available, a critical issue is
to keep the states of each agent within the quantization range
so as to avoid any quantizer saturation. Especially, when data
may be missing due to DoS, we must keep track of the states
by scaling up the quantization range even if the quantization
becomes coarse. (ii) After constructing the quantization of
the states properly, the next issue is to find the tolerable
bound of DoS attacks for achieving consensus. Especially,
if the agent dynamics is unstable, sufficient data must be
exchanged among the multi-agent systems to realize the global
objective of consensus. We will explicitly demonstrate the
trade-off between the resilience against DoS and the available
data rate in communication. Furthermore, it will be shown
that in the absence of DoS attacks, our result in the part of
leaderless consensus is consistent with the one in [23]. (iii)
Last but not least, this paper also reveals another trade-off
between the data rate for the leader state quantization and
the one for the follower state quantization, when one deploys
2non-identical quantizers for them. It is possible to reduce
the overall data rate exchanged through the communication
channel while maintaining the resilience by tuning the data
rate for the leader state quantization.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the framework consisting of multi-agent systems of
general dynamics and the class of DoS attacks. Section III
presents the results of leaderless consensus, which includes
the controller architecture with the zooming-in and zooming-
out dynamic quantization mechanism and sufficient conditions
for data rate and DoS bound under which consensus can
be achieved. Section IV briefly presents the corresponding
results for leader-follower consensus. A numerical example is
presented in Section V, and finally Section VI ends the paper
with conclusions and possible future research directions. The
preliminary results of the problems of quantized leaderless
and leader-follower consensus under DoS can be found in
our previous papers [29] and [30], respectively. Compared
with them, this paper provides full proofs of the results,
more discussions and comparisons between the two dynamic
quantized consensus problems.
Notation. We denote by R the set of reals. Given b ∈ R,
R≥b and R>b denote the sets of reals no smaller than b
and reals greater than b, respectively; R≤b and R<b represent
the sets of reals no larger than b and reals smaller than b,
respectively; Z denotes the set of integers. For any c ∈ Z, we
denote Z≥c := {c, c + 1, · · · }. Let ⌊v⌋ be the floor function
such that ⌊v⌋ = max{o ∈ Z|o ≤ v}. Given a vector y and
a matrix Γ, let ‖y‖ and ‖y‖∞ denote the 2- and ∞- norms
of vector y, respectively, and ‖Γ‖ and ‖Γ‖∞ represent the
corresponding induced norms of matrix Γ. ρ(Γ) denotes the
spectral radius of Γ. Given an interval I, |I| denotes its length.
The Kronecker product is denoted by ⊗. Let 0 and 1 denote
the column vectors with compatible dimensions, having all 0
and 1 elements, respectively.
II. FRAMEWORK: MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS AND DOS
A. Communication graph
We let graph G = (V , E) denote the communication topol-
ogy between agents, where V = {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the
set of agents and E ⊆ V × V denotes the set of edges.
Let Ni denote the set of the neighbors of agent i, where
i = 1, 2, · · · , N . In this paper, we assume that the graph G
is undirected and connected, i.e. if j ∈ Ni, then i ∈ Nj .
Let AG = [aij ] ∈ RN×N denote the adjacency matrix of
the graph G, where aij > 0 if and only if j ∈ Ni and
aii = 0. Define the Laplacian matrix LG = [lij ] ∈ RN×N ,
in which lii =
∑N
j=1 aij and lij = −aij if i 6= j. Let
λi (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ) denote the eigenvalues of LG and in
particular we have λ1 = 0 due to the graph being connected.
B. System description
The agents interacting over the network G are expressed
as homogeneous linear time-invariant systems. For each i =
1, 2, · · · , N , agent i is given as a sampled-data system with
sampling period ∆ ∈ R>0 in the form of
xi(k∆) = Axi((k − 1)∆) +Bui((k − 1)∆) (1)
where k ∈ Z≥1, A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×w. It is assumed
that (A,B) is stabilizable. xi(k∆) ∈ Rn denotes the state of
agent i with xi(0) ∈ Rn as the initial condition. We assume
that an upper bound is known, i.e. ‖xi(0)‖∞ ≤ Cx0 ∈ R>0.
Let ui((k − 1)∆) ∈ Rw denote its control input, whose
computation will be given later.
We assume that the communication channel among the
agents is bandwidth limited and subject to DoS, where trans-
mission attempts take place periodically at time k∆ with
k ∈ Z≥1. Moreover, we assume that the transmission is
acknowledgment based and free of delay. This implies that
the decoders send acknowledgments to the encoders immedi-
ately when they receive encoded signals successfully. If some
acknowledgments are not received by the encoders, it implies
that due to the presence of DoS, the decoders do not receive
any data at all, and hence they do not send acknowledgments.
Agent i = 1, 2, · · · , N can only exchange information with
its neighbor agents j ∈ Ni. Due to the constraints of network
bandwidth, signals are encoded with a limited number of bits.
In the presence of DoS, some of the transmission attempts may
fail. For the ease of notation, we let sr represent the instants
of successful transmissions. Note that s0 ∈ R≥∆ is the instant
when the first successful transmission occurs. Also, we let s−1
denote the time instant 0.
C. Time-constrained DoS
In this paper, we refer to DoS as the event for which all
the encoded signals cannot be received by the decoders and
it affects all the agents. We consider a general DoS model
that describes the attacker’s action by the frequency of DoS
attacks and their duration. Let {hq}q∈Z0 with h0 ≥ ∆ denote
the sequence of DoS off/on transitions, that is, the time instants
at which DoS exhibits a transition from zero (transmissions are
successful) to one (transmissions are not successful). Hence,
Hq := {hq} ∪ [hq, hq + τq[ represents the q-th DoS time-
interval, of a length τq ∈ R≥0, over which the network is
in DoS status. If τq = 0, then Hq takes the form of a single
pulse at hq . Given τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ , let n(τ, t) denote the
number of DoS off/on transitions over [τ, t], and let Ξ(τ, t) :=⋃
q∈Z0 Hq ∩ [τ, t] be the subset of [τ, t] where the network is
in DoS status.
Assumption 1: (DoS frequency). There exist constants η ∈
R≥0 and τD ∈ R>0 such that
n(τ, t) ≤ η + t− τ
τD
(2)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥∆ with t ≥ τ . 
Assumption 2: (DoS duration). There exist constants κ ∈
R≥0 and T ∈ R>1 such that
|Ξ(τ, t)| ≤ κ+ t− τ
T
(3)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥∆ with t ≥ τ . 
Remark 1: Assumptions 1 and 2 do only constrain a given
DoS signal in terms of its average frequency and duration.
Following [31], τD can be defined as the average dwell-
time between consecutive DoS off/on transitions, while η
is the chattering bound. Assumption 2 expresses a similar
3requirement with respect to the duration of DoS. It expresses
the property that, on the average, the total duration over
which communication is interrupted does not exceed a certain
fraction of time, as specified by 1/T . Like η, the constant κ
plays the role of a regularization term. It is needed because
during a DoS interval, one has |Ξ(hq, hq + τq)| = τq > τq/T .
Thus κ serves to make (3) consistent. Conditions τD > 0 and
T > 1 imply that DoS cannot occur at an infinitely fast rate
or be always active. 
The next lemmas relate DoS parameters and the number of
unsuccessful and successful transmissions, respectively.
Lemma 1: Consider a periodic transmission with sampling
interval ∆ along with DoS attacks under Assumptions 1 and
2. If 1/T + ∆/τD < 1, then mr, representing the number
of unsuccessful transmissions between sr−1 and sr with r =
0, 1, · · · , satisfies
mr =
sr − sr−1
∆
− 1
≤M =
⌊
(κ+ η∆) (1− 1/T −∆/τD)−1
∆
⌋
∈ Z≥0. (4)
Proof. This lemma can be easily derived from Lemma 1 in
[32] and we refer the readers to the full proof there. 
For the ease of notation, we let m represent mr in the
subsequent sections.
Lemma 2: Consider the DoS attacks characterized by
Assumptions 1 and 2 and the network sampling period ∆.
If 1/T +∆/τD < 1, then TS(∆, k∆), denoting the number of
successful transmissions within the interval [∆, k∆], satisfies
TS(∆, k∆) ≥
(
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
)
k − κ+ η∆
∆
. (5)
Proof. This lemma can be easily derived from Lemma 3 in
[33] and we refer the readers to that paper. 
Remark 2: If the network is free of DoS attacks (T =
τD = ∞ and κ = η = 0), then m = M = 0 and
TS(∆, k∆) = k, i.e. there is no failure in transmissions
between sr−1 and sr for every r, and every transmission
attempt will be successful, respectively. Therefore, they reduce
to nominal standard periodic transmissions. 
D. Uniform quantizer
The limitation of bandwidth implies that transmitted signals
are subject to quantization. Let χ ∈ R be the original
scalar signal before quantization and qR(·) be the quantization
function for scalar input values as
qR(χ) =


0 −σ < χ < σ
2zσ (2z − 1)σ ≤ χ < (2z + 1)σ
2Rσ χ ≥ (2R+ 1)σ
−qR(−χ) χ ≤ −σ
(6)
where R ∈ Z>0 is to be designed and z = 1, 2, ..., R, and σ ∈
R>0. If the quantizer is unsaturated such that χ ≤ (2R+1)σ,
then the error induced by quantization satisfies
|χ− qR(χ)| ≤ σ, if |χ| ≤ (2R+ 1)σ. (7)
Observe that the quantizer has 2R+1 levels and is determined
by two parameters σ and R, which determine the density and
quantization range of the quantizer, respectively. Moreover,
we define the vector version of the quantization function as
QR(β) = [ qR(β1) qR(β2) · · · qR(βf ) ]T ∈ Rf , where β =
[β1 β2 · · ·βf ]T ∈ Rf with f ∈ Z≥1.
III. LEADERLESS QUANTIZED CONSENSUS UNDER DOS
The objective of this section is to design a quantized
controller, possibly dynamic, in such a way that a finite-level
quantizer is not overflowed and the multi-agent system (1)
can tolerate as many DoS attacks as possible for reaching
consensus. Specifically, we introduce the average of the states
x¯(k∆) = (
N∑
i=1
xi(k∆))/N ∈ Rn (8)
and consensus among the agents is defined by
lim
k→∞
‖xi(k∆) − x¯(k∆)‖∞ = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (9)
For the ease of illustration, in the remainder of the paper
we simply let k represent k∆, e.g. xi(k) represents xi(k∆).
A. Control architecture for leaderless consensus
For each agent i, the control input ui(k) is expressed as
a function of the relative states available locally at time k.
Specifically, it is given by
ui(k) = K
N∑
j=1
aij(xˆ
i
j(k)− xˆii(k)), k = 0, 1, · · · (10)
where xˆij(k) ∈ Rn denotes the estimation of the state of agent
j by agent i, whose computation will be given later. Here we
assume that there exists a feedback gain K ∈ Rw×n such that
the spectral radius of
J(1) = diag(A− λ2BK, · · · , A− λNBK) (11)
satisfies ρ(J(1)) < 1. This is a necessary and sufficient
condition for consensus when no DoS is present and infinite
bandwidth is available for communication [34].
In (10), the estimate of the state of agent j by agent i equals
the one estimated by agent l such that xˆij(k) = xˆ
l
j(k) = xˆ
j
j(k)
with i, l ∈ Nj , then we omit the superscripts and let
ui(k) = K
N∑
j=1
aij(xˆj(k)− xˆi(k)), k = 0, 1, · · · . (12)
Agent i estimates the states of its neighbors based on the
information available from communication. Also, to stay con-
sistent with the neighbors, it will compute the estimate of its
own. These estimated states will be computed at each time
k = 1, 2, · · · as
xˆj(k) =
{
Axˆj(k − 1) + θ(k − 1)Qˆj(k) if k /∈ Hq
Axˆj(k − 1) if k ∈ Hq (13)
where j ∈ {i} ∪ Ni and the initial estimates will be set as
xˆj(0) = 0. Here, Qˆj(k) ∈ Rn contains the information of
xj(k) and is defined as
Qˆj(k) = QR
(
xj(k)−Axˆj(k − 1)
θ(k − 1)
)
, k = 1, 2, · · · . (14)
4An important parameter in the quantization in (14) is the
scaling parameter θ(k− 1). By adjusting its size dynamically,
the state will be kept within the bounded quantization range
without saturation. The scaling parameter θ(k) ∈ R>0 can be
updated as
θ(k) =
{
γ1θ(k − 1) if k /∈ Hq
γ2θ(k − 1) if k ∈ Hq k = 1, 2, · · · (15)
with θ(0) = θ0 ∈ R>0, where 0 < γ1 < 1 and γ2 > 0. The
parameters γ1 and γ2 are for zooming in and out such that the
quantization scaling parameter θ(k) changes dynamically to
mitigate the influence of DoS. Under DoS attacks, the states of
the multi-agent systems may diverge. Therefore, the quantizers
must zoom out and increase their ranges so that the states
can be measured properly. If the transmissions succeed, the
quantizers zoom in and θ(k) decreases by using γ1. The design
of γ1, γ2 and θ0 will be specified later. Observe that the scaling
parameter is updated locally at each agent by checking the
presence of DoS attacks over time.
Due to the constraints of channel bandwidth, the information
about the state xj(k) is quantized into Qˆj(k) as in (14). If the
transmission attempts succeed, the decoders estimate xj(k)
by the first equation in (13) and the scaling parameter θ(k) in
the encoders and decoders zooms in as in the first equation in
(15). If the transmission attempt fails, the information of xj(k)
cannot be acquired by the decoders since Qˆj(k) is corrupted
by DoS. Then, the decoders estimate xj(k) by the second
equation in (13) and the scaling parameter θ(k) in the encoders
and decoders zooms out as in the second equation in (15).
Note that in the control input (12), we use xˆi(k) to compute
ui(k) instead of xi(k). Due to space limitation, we omit the
details of the rationales and refer the readers to the discussion
regarding (52) in [23] and the references therein.
Let xˆ(k) = [xˆT1 (k) xˆ
T
2 (k) · · · xˆTN (k)]T ∈ RnN and Q(k) =
[QˆT1 (k) Qˆ
T
2 (k) · · · QˆTN (k)]T ∈ RnN . One can obtain the
compact form of (13) as
xˆ(k) =
{
(IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1) + θ(k − 1)Q(k) if k /∈ Hq
(IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1) if k ∈ Hq
(16)
for k = 1, 2, · · · . Let ei(k) = xi(k)− xˆi(k) ∈ Rn denote the
estimation error and let e(k) = [eT1 (k) e
T
2 (k) · · · eTN (k)]T ∈
R
nN and x(k) = [xT1 (k) x
T
2 (k) · · ·xTN (k)]T ∈ RnN . Then
one obtains the compact form of the dynamics of the agents
x(k) = Gx(k − 1) + Le(k − 1) (17)
where
G = IN ⊗A− LG ⊗BK, L = LG ⊗BK. (18)
Recall the average of the states x¯(k) in (8). The dis-
crepancy between the state of agent i and x¯ is denoted
by δi(k) = xi(k) − x¯(k) ∈ Rn. By defining δ(k) =
[δT1 (k) δ
T
2 (k) · · · δTN (k)]T ∈ RnN , one has x(k) = δ(k) +
IN ⊗ x¯(k). By applying it to (17), one obtains
δ(k) = Gδ(k − 1) + Le(k − 1). (19)
It is clear that the eigenvalues of G equal to those of J(1)
in (11). Recall that ρ(J(1)) < 1 under the feedback gain K .
Hence the spectral radius of G is less than 1. Then it is clear
that if ‖δ(k)‖∞ → 0 as k →∞, consensus of the multi-agent
system (1) is achieved as in (9). If ‖e(k)‖ = 0 for all k, it is
obvious that consensus is achieved due to ρ(G) < 1. Under
DoS attacks, however, e(k) may diverge and consequently
consensus among the agents may not be achieved.
B. Dynamics of the multi-agent systems
In this subsection, we present the dynamics of the multi-
agent system under quantization, in terms of e(k) with e(k−1)
and δ(k−1) for the two cases, i.e. in the absence and presence
of DoS attacks.
If the transmission succeeds such that k /∈ Hq for k =
1, 2, · · · , then according to (16), one has
e(k) =x(k) − xˆ(k)
=x(k) − (IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1)− θ(k − 1)Q(k)
=x(k) − (IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1)
− θ(k − 1)QR
(
x(k)− (IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1)
θ(k − 1)
)
. (20)
Note that
x(k)− (IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1) = He(k − 1)− Lδ(k − 1) (21)
where
H = IN ⊗A+ LG ⊗BK. (22)
Then (20) can be rewritten as
e(k) =He(k − 1)− Lδ(k − 1)
− θ(k − 1)QR
(
He(k − 1)− Lδ(k − 1)
θ(k − 1)
)
. (23)
If the transmission fails such that k ∈ Hq for k = 1, 2, · · · ,
then in view of (16), one has
e(k) = x(k) − xˆ(k)
= x(k) − (IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1). (24)
Then apply (21) to (24).
In the above, we have presented the system dynamics using
e(k) and δ(k). To facilitate the analysis, we let
α(k) = δ(k)/θ(k) ξ(k) = e(k)/θ(k) (25)
where θ(k) is given in (15). Then we formulate the system
dynamics in terms of α(k) and ξ(k).
If the transmission succeeds such that k /∈ Hq , in view of
the first relation in (15), (19) and (23), one has
α(k) =
G
γ1
α(k − 1) + L
γ1
ξ(k − 1) (26)
ξ(k) =
Hξ(k − 1)− Lα(k − 1)
γ1
− QR (Hξ(k − 1)− Lα(k − 1))
γ1
. (27)
It is easy to infer that if ‖Hξ(k − 1) − Lα(k − 1)‖∞ ≤
(2R+ 1)σ, then by (7) one has ‖ξ(k)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1.
5If the transmission fails such that k ∈ Hq , then according
to the second case in (15), (19) and (24), one has
α(k) =
G
γ2
α(k − 1) + L
γ2
ξ(k − 1) (28)
ξ(k) =
H
γ2
ξ(k − 1)− L
γ2
α(k − 1). (29)
Compared with (27), ξ(k) induced by (29) may not satisfy
‖ξ(k)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1. In the event that ‖ξ(k)‖∞ > σ/γ1, there
is a possibility that ‖Hξ(k)−Lα(k)‖∞ > (2R+1)σ, which
demonstrates that quantizer overflow occurs.
We explain the intuition of the zooming-in and zooming-
out mechanism in the context of quantized control of multi-
agent systems under transmission losses. In the dynamics of
α(k) and ξ(k) in (26) and (27) under successful transmissions,
one can see that γ1 appears in the denominators on the right-
hand sides. Similarly, in (28) and (29), γ2 appears in the case
of transmission failures. Intuitively, when the systems are in
the open-loop status due to DoS attacks, if we can find a
sufficiently large γ2 that can compensate the growth of α(k)
and ξ(k) by dividing γ2, then α(k) and ξ(k) are likely to
remain “small” during DoS. As a result, it is possible to keep
‖Hξ(k)−Lα(k)‖∞ ≤ (2R+1)σ during DoS, which implies
that quantizer overflow will not occur during DoS.
While the idea of zooming-in and zooming-out is intuitive,
the computation of the parameters γ1 and γ2 are challenging
in the context of quantized control of multi-agent systems.
Compared with quantized control of centralized systems, e.g.
in [8], [17], [35], one of the challenges in this paper is
raised by the constraint of distributed systems, where each
agent knows only a fraction of the global information. Due to
this, the “decedent” state estimation/prediction scheme as in
the papers [8], [17], [35] is very difficult to implement here
and more importantly the estimation error also depends on
the state, e.g. ξ(k) depends on α(k) in (29). By contract,
in quantized control of centralized systems, this coupling
problem between estimation error and state can be tackled.
In the following, with the control scheme introduced in (12)
to (15), we will show that quantizer overflow will not occur
by properly designing the scaling parameter θ(k) in (15) with
γ1 and γ2, and then discuss the trade-offs between resilience
and data rate.
C. Overflow-free quantizer and leaderless consensus
In this subsection, we will present the results for quantized
leaderless consensus under DoS, showing the number of
quantizer levels such that it is not overflowed, and a sufficient
condition for consensus. Before presenting the results, we
introduce some preliminaries that will be used in the theorem.
In view of the matrices G, L and H in (18) and (22),
respectively, we define the matrices
A¯ =
[
G L
−L H
]
, A¯(m) = A¯m =
[
A¯11(m) A¯12(m)
A¯21(m) A¯22(m)
]
(30)
where A¯11(m), A¯12(m), A¯21(m) and A¯22(m) are compatible
submatrices with dimensions nN × nN in A¯(m) and the
integer m satisfies 0 ≤ m ≤ M as in Lemma 1. Then, we
define G(m+ 1) and G¯(m+ 1) as
G(m+ 1) = (GA¯11(m) + LA¯21(m))/γ
m
2 (31)
G¯(m+ 1) = (U ⊗ In)TG(m+ 1)(U ⊗ In) (32)
in which the unitary matrix U is
U = [1/
√
N φ2 · · · φN ] ∈ RN×N (33)
where φi ∈ RN with i = 2, 3, · · · , N satisfies φTi LG = λiφTi .
Let the matrix J(m + 1) ∈ Rn(N−1)×n(N−1) denote the
remaining parts of G¯(m+ 1) in (32) after deleting the first n
rows and columns. Then we define the set J as
J = {J(1), · · · , J(m+ 1), · · · , J(M + 1)}. (34)
Note that J(m + 1) is reduced to J(1) in (11) then m = 0,
which is independent of γ2. If 1 ≤ m ≤ M , when J(m+ 1)
is dependent on γ2. With the matrices A¯12(m) and A¯22(m)
in (30), and G and L in (18) , we let
L(m+ 1) = (GA¯12(m) + LA¯22(m))/γ
m
2 (35)
and then compute
C0 = max
m=0,1,··· ,M
‖L(m+ 1)‖. (36)
With such C0, we further compute
C1 = max
{
2C2
√
Nn,
C0C2
√
Nnσ
(1− d)γ1
}
(37)
where the parameters satisfy C2 > 0, and ρ(J(1)) < d < 1
depends on the choices of γ1 and γ2.
Now we are ready to present the results for quantized
leaderless consensus under DoS attacks.
Theorem 1: Consider the multi-agent system (1) with control
inputs (12) to (15), where they exchange information via the
undirected graph G. The communication attempts are periodic
with sampling interval ∆. Suppose that the DoS attacks char-
acterized in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfy 1/T+∆/τD < 1. Let
γ1 and γ2 be chosen such that maxm=1,2,··· ,M ρ(J(m+1)) ≤
ρ(J(1)) < γ1 < 1, where J(1) and J(m+ 1) are in (11) and
(34), respectively, and let θ0 ≥ Cx0γ1σ. Then, the quantizer
(6) is not overflowed, if R satisfies
2R+ 1 ≥ ‖[−L H ]‖∞ζ
√
C21 +Nn
γ1
(38)
with C1 ∈ R>0 in (37), ζ = max{1, ‖(A¯/γ2)M‖}, A¯ in (30)
and M in Lemma 1. Moreover, if (38) holds and DoS attacks
satisfy
1
T
+
∆
τD
<
− ln γ1
ln γ2 − ln γ1 (39)
then consensus of xi(k∆) is achieved as in (9) when k →∞.
To facilitate the proof of Theorem 1, we first introduce the
lemma below, whose proof is provided in the Appendix.
Lemma 3: Take γ1 and γ2 such that
max
m=1,2,··· ,M
ρ(J(m+ 1)) ≤ ρ(J(1)) < γ1 < 1 (40)
6and let θ0 ≥ Cx0γ1/σ. If ‖ξ(sp)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 for p =
0, 1, · · · , r, then ‖[αT (sr) ξT (sr)]T ‖ is upper-bounded as
‖[αT (sr) ξT (sr)]T ‖ ≤ σ
√
C21 +Nn/γ1 (41)
with C1 in (37).
Proof of Theorem 1. In the following, we will first show
that the uniform quantizer (6) does not saturate if the number
of quantization levels satisfy (38). Then, we show that the
leaderless consensus among the agents is achieved under (39).
The unsaturation of the quantizer is proved by induction.
More specifically we show that if the quantizer is not over-
flowed such that ‖ξ(sr)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 for r = −1, 0, · · · , then
the quantizer will not saturate at the transmission attempts
within ]sr, sr+1] and hence ‖ξ(sr+1)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1.
a) If sr+1 = sr + ∆, in view of (27), it is easy to verify
that the quantizer Q(sr+1) = QR(Hξ(sr) − Lα(sr)) is not
overflowed in the sense that∥∥∥[−L H ] [ αT (sr) ξT (sr) ]T ∥∥∥∞ ≤ (2R+ 1)σ (42)
where the norm of [αT (sr) ξ
T (sr)]
T is given in Lemma 3.
This implies ‖ξ(sr+1)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1.
b) If sr+1 > sr+∆, it means that the transmissions before
sr+1 at the instants sr+∆, sr+2∆, · · · , sr+m∆ fail, where
m ≤M . We verify that the quantizer is also free of overflow
at the instants sr+∆, sr+2∆, · · · , sr+m∆ and sr+1 since∥∥∥∥[−L H ]
[
α(sr +m∆)
ξ(sr +m∆)
]∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ ‖[−L H ]‖∞
∥∥∥∥ A¯(m)γm2
∥∥∥∥
2
∥∥∥∥
[
α(sr)
ξ(sr)
]∥∥∥∥
2
≤ (2R+ 1)σ, 0 ≤ m ≤M. (43)
This implies ‖ξ(sr+1)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1. In view of a) and b), by
induction, we conclude that the quantizer satisfying (38) is not
overflowed for all transmissions.
Now we will show leaderless consensus in the states. If the
quantizer is not saturated, then one has
‖α(sr +m∆)‖∞ ≤ ‖[αT (sr +m∆) ξT (sr +m∆)]T ‖
≤ ∥∥A¯(m)/γm2 ∥∥ ∥∥[αT (sr) ξT (sr)]T ∥∥
≤ σ ∥∥A¯(m)/γm2 ∥∥√C21 +Nn/γ1 (44)
for 1 ≤ m ≤ M , where the third inequality is obtained from
(41). Incorporating the scenario of m = 0, we have
‖α(k)‖∞ ≤ σζ
√
C21 +Nn/γ1 (45)
where ζ = max{1, ‖(A¯/γ2)M‖}. Recall the definition of
TS(∆, k∆) in Lemma 2 and let TU (∆, k∆) denote the number
of unsuccessful transmissions in [∆, k∆]. In view of δ(k) =
θ(k)α(k) = γ
TS(∆,k∆)
1 γ
TU (∆,k∆)
2 θ0α(k), one has
‖δ(k)‖∞ ≤ C3γkθ0‖α(k)‖∞ ≤ C3γkθ0ζ
√
C21 +Nnσ/γ1
(46)
where C3 = (γ2/γ1)
(κ+η∆)/∆
and
γ = γ
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
1 γ
1
T
+ ∆
τD
2 < 1 (47)
by (39). Thus, we have ‖δ(k)‖∞ → 0 when k → ∞, which
implies that leaderless consensus is achieved. 
Remark 3: This remark concerns the rationale of the
computations of γ1 and γ2. The iteration of ‖α(sr)‖ depends
on the spectral radius of J(m+ 1)/γ1, where m denotes the
number of unsuccessful transmissions between sr−1 and sr. If
one selects γ1 and γ2 as (40), then maxm=1,2,··· ,M ρ(J(m+
1))/γ1 ≤ ρ(J(1))/γ1 < 1, which essentially implies that
{‖α(sr)‖} is not a diverging sequence along {sr} despite
that there are transmission failures between sr−1 and sr. If
no DoS attacks occur between sr−1 and sr, then m = 0 and
hence the iteration of ‖α(sr)‖ based on ‖α(sr−1)‖ depends
on ρ(J(1))/γ1, which is the result achieved in [23].
Remark 4: In view of the right-hand side of (39), it is good
to have small γ1 and γ2 for improving the robustness, though
a small γ1 will result in large data rate. In view of the remark
above, it is clear that γ1 can affect 2R + 1 directly in (38).
More importantly, γ1 can also affect C1 in the sense that if one
lets γ1 → ρ(J(1)), then C1 →∞. It is clear that if there are
no DoS attacks in the network, then γ = γ1 and the control
approach in this paper reduces to the one in [23]. The principle
of selecting γ2 is to make ρ(J(m+1)) ≤ ρ(J(1)) hold, where
m 6= 0. Then, γ2 essentially depends on the systems to be
controlled, the communication topology and M that depends
on DoS (see Lemma 1). 
IV. LEADER-FOLLOWER CONSENSUS UNDER DOS
In this section, we will discuss the problem of leader-
follower consensus under DoS attacks. The dynamics of the
followers is taken as (1). Let 0 be the index for the leader.
The dynamics of the leader is given as an autonomous system
such that
x0(k∆) = Ax0((k − 1)∆), k ∈ Z≥1 (48)
where x0(k) ∈ Rn is the state of the leader, and A and ∆
are the same as in (1). Similarly to the scenario of leaderless
consensus, we assume that an upper bound on the initial state
of the leader is known as ‖x0(0)‖∞ ≤ C˜x0 . For the ease of
analysis, we assume that C˜x0 ≤ Cx0 . We say that the leader-
follower consensus is achieved if
lim
k→∞
‖xi(k∆)− x0(k∆)‖∞ = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (49)
In this section, the communication topology among the
followers is represented by an undirected and connected graph
G as in Section II–A, whose Laplacian matrix is denoted by
LG . We also assume that only a fraction of the followers
can receive the information from the leader. Let ai0 represent
the leader-follower interaction, i.e. if agent i can directly
receive the information from the leader, then ai0 > 0, and
otherwise ai0 = 0. Moreover, we let the diagonal matrix be
D = diag(a10, a20, · · · , aN0) ∈ RN×N . For simplicity, in the
following analysis, we let k represent k∆.
7A. Framework of leader-follower control
For achieving the leader-follower consensus as in (49), we
let the control input to the follower agent i ∈ V in (1) as
ui(k) = K
N∑
j=1
aij(xˆj(k)− xˆi(k)) +Kai0(xˆ0(k)− xˆi(k))
(50)
where xˆj(k) denotes the estimate of xj(k) obtained by (13)
and (14) for j ∈ {i}∪Ni. Besides, xˆ0(k) denotes the estima-
tion of x0(k) and is also estimated as in (13) and (14). The
zooming-in and zooming-out quantization mechanism is still
valid for leaderless consensus control. The scaling parameter
θ(k) is in the form as in (15). The zooming-in and zooming-
out parameters γ1 and γ2 for leader-follower consensus will be
given later in this section. Here we assume that there exists a
feedback gain K ∈ Rw×n for leader-follower consensus such
that the spectral radius of A − λ˜iBK (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ) are
smaller than 1, where λ˜i denote the eigenvalues of LG +D.
We let δ˜i(k) = xi(k) − x0(k) and ei(k) = xi(k) − xˆi(k).
Moreover, let e0(k) = x0(k)− xˆ0(k). With the defined δ˜i, ei
and e0, substituting (50) into (1), we obtain the dynamics of
δ˜i(k) as
δ˜i(k)
= Aδ˜i(k − 1) +BK
N∑
j=1
aij(δ˜j(k − 1)− δ˜i(k − 1))
−BKai0δ˜i(k − 1)−BK
N∑
j=1
aij(ej(k − 1)− ei(k − 1))
+BKai0ei(k − 1)−BKai0e0(k − 1). (51)
Let the vectors be δ˜(k) = [δ˜T1 (k) δ˜
T
2 (k) · · · δ˜TN (k)]T and
e(k) = [eT1 (k) e
T
2 (k) · · · eTN (k)]T . In view of (51), we obtain
the compact form
δ˜(k) = Πδ˜(k − 1) + Σe(k − 1)− Φ(1N ⊗ e0(k − 1)) (52)
where the matrices are given by
Π = IN ⊗A− (LG +D)⊗BK, Σ = (LG +D)⊗BK
Φ = D ⊗BK. (53)
Note that the eigenvalues of Π equal to those of A − λ˜iBK
with spectral radius ρ(A − λ˜iBK) < 1 (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ).
By such K , the spectral radius of Π is smaller than 1. If the
dynamics of δ˜(k) in (52) is stable such that ‖δ˜(k)‖∞ → 0 as
k →∞, then the leader-follower consensus is achieved as in
(49).
B. System dynamics of leader-follower consensus under DoS
In light of (52), one sees that the convergence of δ˜(k)
depends on e(k) and e0(k). We first analyze e0(k), whose
dynamics follows
e0(k) =
{
Ae0(k − 1)− θ(k − 1)QR
(
Ae0(k−1)
θ(k−1)
)
k /∈ Hq
Ae0(k − 1) k ∈ Hq.
(54)
It is clear that the dynamics of e0(k) depends on only
e0(k−1), which is different from that in leaderless consensus
where the dynamics of ei(k) depends on ei(k− 1), ej(k− 1),
δi(k − 1) and δj(k − 1) (j ∈ Ni). This is because that the
leader agent does not receive information from its neighbors
and hence its state is decoupled from those of the followers.
On the other hand, the phenomenon that the estimation errors
of followers’ states are coupled still remains as occured
in leaderless consensus problem. As we will see later, the
estimation errors of followers’ states are also coupled with
e0(k).
Now we discuss the evolution of e(k). In the scenario of
leader-follower consensus, the equations (20) and (24) still
hold. However, the item x(k)− (IN ⊗A)xˆ(k− 1) is different
from the one in (21), and now it is in the form of
x(k) − (IN ⊗A)xˆ(k − 1)
= Ωe(k − 1)− Σδ˜(k − 1)− Φ(1N ⊗ e0(k − 1)) (55)
where
Ω = IN ⊗A+ (LG +D)⊗BK. (56)
Substituting (55) into (20) and (24), respectively, one can
obtain the dynamics of e(k) in the absence and presence of
DoS attacks in the scenario of leader-follower consensus. Due
to space limitation, we omit presenting them. Define three
vectors β(k), ǫ(k) and ǫ0(k) ∈ RnN
β(k) =
δ˜(k)
θ(k)
, ǫ(k) =
e(k)
θ(k)
, ǫ0(k) =
1N ⊗ e0(k)
θ(k)
. (57)
Then we obtain the dynamics of these variables for the two
cases, i.e. successful and failed transmissions.
If the transmission succeeds such that k /∈ Hq, we have
β(k) =
Π
γ1
β(k − 1) + Σ
γ1
ǫ(k − 1)− Φ
γ1
ǫ0(k − 1) (58)
ǫ(k) =
Ω
γ1
ǫ(k − 1)− Σ
γ1
β(k − 1)− Φ
γ1
ǫ0(k − 1)
− 1
γ1
QR (Ωǫ(k − 1)− Σβ(k − 1)− Φǫ0(k − 1))
(59)
ǫ0(k) =
IN ⊗A
γ1
ǫ0(k − 1)− 1
γ1
QR((IN ⊗A)ǫ0(k − 1)).
(60)
If the transmission fails such that k ∈ Hq, we have
β(k) =
Π
γ2
β(k − 1) + Σ
γ2
ǫ(k − 1)− Φ
γ2
ǫ0(k − 1) (61)
ǫ(k) =
Ω
γ2
ǫ(k − 1)− Σ
γ2
β(k − 1)− Φ
γ2
ǫ0(k − 1) (62)
ǫ0(k) =
IN ⊗A
γ2
ǫ0(k − 1). (63)
Comparing the expressions of QR(·) in (27) and (59),
one sees that the dynamics of ǫ(k) (transformed estimation
error of follower state) also depends on ǫ0(k) (transformed
estimation error of leader state). By contrast, in the leader-
less consensus problem, this does not occur. Therefore, the
leader state also needs be properly quantized. This is one of
8the major differences of leader-follower consensus from the
leaderless one. By (59) and (60), it is easy to infer that if
‖Ωǫ(k − 1) − Σβ(k − 1) − Φǫ0(k − 1)‖∞ ≤ (2R + 1)σ
and ‖(IN ⊗ A)ǫ0(k − 1)‖∞ ≤ 2R + 1, then by (7) one has
‖ǫ(k)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 and ‖ǫ0(k)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1, respectively. This
means that if the transmissions succeed at k, ǫ(k) and ǫ0(k)
can be reset.
By observing (62), it is possible that ‖ǫ(k)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 does
not hold during DoS, since ǫ(k) cannot be reset as in (59).
Similar to the case in the leaderless consensus problem, here in
the event that ‖ǫ(k)‖∞ > σ/γ1, there is also a possibility that
‖Ωǫ(k)−Σβ(k)−Φǫ0(k)‖∞ > (2R+1)σ, which demonstrates
that quantizer overflow for the follower state occurs. Moreover,
in view of (60) and (63), the overflow problem can also happen
to the quantization of leader state during DoS. In the following,
with the control scheme introduced in (50), we will show that
quantizer overflow for both leader and follower states will not
occur if one properly designs the scaling parameter θ(k) in
(15). Then we will discuss the trade-offs between resilience
and data rate.
C. Result for leader-follower consensus
To facilitate the subsequent analysis of leader-follower
consensus, we introduce some preliminaries.
In view of the matrices Π, Σ, Φ and Ω in (53) and (56),
respectively, we define the matrices
A˜ =

 Π Σ −Φ−Σ Ω −Φ
IN ⊗A

 and (64)
A˜(m) = A˜m =

 A˜11(m) A˜12(m) A˜13(m)A˜21(m) A˜22(m) A˜23(m)
IN ⊗Am

 (65)
where A˜11(m), A˜12(m), A˜13(m), A˜21(m), A˜22(m) and
A˜23(m) are compatible submatrices of A˜(m) and the in-
teger m satisfies 0 ≤ m ≤ M as in Lemma 1. Then,
we define P (m + 1) = (ΠA˜11(m) + ΣA˜21(m))/γ
m
2 ,
S(m + 1) = (ΠA˜12(m) + ΣA˜22(m))/γ
m
2 and Z(m +
1) = (ΠA˜13(m) + ΣA˜23(m) − Φ(IN ⊗ Am))/γm2 .
Let C˜0 = maxm=0,1,··· ,M ‖S(m + 1)‖ and C˜1 =
maxm=0,1,··· ,M ‖Z(m+1)‖. There exists a unitary matrix Ψ˜
such that Ψ˜−1(LG+D)Ψ˜ is an upper-triangular matrix whose
diagonals are λ˜i (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ), which are the eigenvalues
of LG +D [36]. With the Ψ˜, we define the matrices
P˜ (m+ 1) = (Ψ˜ ⊗ In)TP (m+ 1)(Ψ˜⊗ In). (66)
Then we define the set of matrices P as
P = {P˜ (1), · · · , P˜ (m+ 1), · · · , P˜ (M + 1)} (67)
where in particular we have
P˜ (1) =


A− λ˜1BK ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
A− λ˜2BK ⋆ ⋆
. . .
...
A− λ˜NBK

 . (68)
with ⋆ presenting compatible matrices. Finally, we let
C˜3 = max
{
2C˜4
√
Nn,
C˜2C˜4
√
Nn
(1− d˜)γ1
}
(69)
where the parameters satisfy C˜2 = C˜0 + C˜1, C˜4 > 0, and
ρ(P˜ (1)) < d˜ < 1 depends on the choices of γ1 and γ2. For
details, we refer to the Appendix.
Now we are ready to present the results for leader-follower
consensus.
Theorem 2: Consider the multi-agent system (1) as the
follower agent with control action (50), (13) to (15). The
leader agent is given in (48). The communication attempts
are periodic with sampling interval ∆. Suppose that the
DoS attacks characterized in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfy
1/T + ∆/τD < 1. Let γ1 and γ2 be chosen such that
maxm=1,2,··· ,M ρ(P˜ (m + 1)) ≤ ρ(P˜ (1)) < γ1 < 1, where
P˜ (1) and P˜ (m+1) are in (68) and (66), respectively, and let
θ0 ≥ Cx0γ1/σ. Then, the quantizer (6) is not overflowed, if
R satisfies
2R+ 1 ≥ ζ˜‖[−Σ Ω − Φ]‖∞
√
C˜23 + 2Nn/γ1 (70)
with ζ˜ = max{1, ‖(A˜/γ2)M‖, ‖(A/γ2)M‖}, A˜ in (64) andM
in Lemma 1, C˜3 ∈ R>0 in (69). Moreover, if (70) holds and
DoS attacks satisfy (39), then the leader-follower consensus
as in (49) is achieved.
To facilitate the proof, we first present the following Lemma
4 whose proof is given in the Appendix. After the lemma, we
provide the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4: Take γ1 and γ2 for the leader-follower consensus
such that
max
m=1,2,··· ,M
ρ(P˜ (m+ 1)) ≤ ρ(P˜ (1)) < γ1 < 1 (71)
and let θ0 ≥ Cx0γ1/σ. If ‖ǫ(sp)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 and ‖ǫ0(sp)‖∞ ≤
σ/γ1 for p = 0, 1, · · · , r, then ‖[βT (sr) ǫT (sr) ǫT0 (sr)]T ‖ is
upper-bounded as
‖[βT (sr) ǫT (sr) ǫT0 (sr)]T ‖ ≤ σ
√
C˜23 + 2Nn/γ1 (72)
with C˜3 in (69). 
Proof of Theorem 2. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1,
we will first show that the quantizer (6) does not saturate
if the number of quantization levels satisfy (70). Then, we
will show that the leader-follower consensus is achieved under
(39). The unsaturation of the quantizer is proved by induction.
Specifically, if the quantizer is not overflowed such that
‖ǫ(sr)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 and ‖ǫ0(sr)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 for r = −1, 0, · · · ,
then the quantizer will not saturate at the transmission attempts
within ]sr, sr+1], which implies ‖ǫ(sr+1)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 and
‖ǫ0(sr+1)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1.
a) If sr+1 = sr +∆, in view of (59) and (60), it is easy to
verify that the quantizer QR (Ωǫ(sr)− Σβ(sr)− Φǫ0(sr)) of
the follower agents is not overflowed in the sense that
‖[−Σ Ω − Φ] [βT (sr) ǫT (sr) ǫT0 (sr)]T ‖∞ ≤ (2R+ 1)σ
where the norm of [βT (sr) ǫ
T (sr) ǫ
T
0 (sr)]
T is given in
Lemma 4. This implies ‖ǫ(sr+1)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 in view of (59).
It is clear that ‖A‖∞ ≤ ‖[−Σ Ω Φ]‖∞ and ‖ǫ0(sr)‖∞ ≤
9σ/γ1, and thus QR((IN ⊗A)ǫ0(sr)) for the leader state is not
saturated because
‖(IN ⊗A)ǫ0(sr)‖∞ ≤ ‖A‖∞σ/γ1
≤ ‖[−Σ Ω − Φ]‖∞σ/γ1
≤ (2R+ 1)σ. (73)
b) If sr+1 > sr + ∆, it means that the transmissions at
sr + ∆, sr + 2∆, · · · , sr + m∆ fail, where m ≤ M . We
verify that the quantizers for the follower states are also free
of overflow at those instants as well as sr+1 since∥∥∥∥∥∥[−Σ Ω − Φ]

 β(sr +m∆)ǫ(sr +m∆)
ǫ0(sr +m∆)


∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥[−Σ Ω − Φ]
(
A˜
γ2
)m  β(sr)ǫ(sr)
ǫ0(sr)


∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ ζ˜‖[−Σ Ω − Φ]‖∞σ
√
C˜23 + 2Nn/γ1
≤ (2R+ 1)σ. (74)
Similarly, we can also verify the unsaturation of the quantizer
for the leader state in the sense that
‖(IN ⊗A)ǫ0(sr +m∆)‖∞
≤ ‖(IN ⊗A) (IN ⊗A/γ2)m ǫ0(sr)‖∞
≤ ζ˜‖A‖∞σ/γ1 ≤ (2R+ 1)σ. (75)
In view of a) and b) above, by induction, we conclude
that the quantizer satisfying (70) is not overflowed for all
transmissions in the scenario of leader-follower consensus.
Following the calculation similar to that after (44) in the
proof of Theorem 1, one can obtain that ‖β(k)‖∞ is upper-
bounded. When (39) is satisfied, one has θ(k)→ 0 and hence
‖δ˜(k)‖∞ → 0 with k → ∞, which implies that the leader-
follower consensus in (49) is achieved. 
Remark 5: In this section, we take the quantizers for the
leader and follower state to be identical for the ease of analysis.
Similar to the leaderless consensus scenario, it is good to
have small γ1 that results in large data rate, and small γ2
for improving the robustness. However, when one observes
(74) and (75), it is clear that ζ˜‖A‖∞σ/γ1 could be much
smaller than ζ˜‖[−Σ Ω − Φ]‖∞σ
√
C˜23 + 2Nn/γ1, which
implies that the encoding bits for the leader state could be
much smaller than the ones deployed for the follower state. 
Remark 6: If one deploys non-identical quantizers for the
leader and followers, then there are also trade-offs between
the data rates for them in the sense that a more accurate
estimation of x0(k) can reduce the data rate for the followers
quantization, by observing ǫ0 in (73) and (74). This implies
that it is possible to increase the data rate for the leader
quantization in order to reduce the one for the followers.
By doing so, if the number of the follower agent is not that
small, the overall communication load can be reduced while
in contrast the resilience of the systems is not affected. 
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, conduct simulation to verify our results.
To this end, we transform the unstable agent systems in
the simulation in [37] into the corresponding sampled-data
systems with sampling interval ∆ = 0.1s and obtain
A =
[
1.1052 0.1105
0 1.1052
]
, B =
[
0.1052 0.0053
0 0.1052
]
.
(76)
For leaderless consensus, we consider the scenario of four
agents, and they exchange data through an undirected and con-
nected communication graph G. For leader-follower consensus,
we consider a scenario of one leader agent and four follower
agents. The communication topology among the follower
agents is the same as the one in the leaderless consensus,
that is G. The leader agent has interactions with two of the
follower agents, which can be presented by the matrix D. The
matrices LG and D are given by
LG =


1 −1 0 0
−1 3 −1 −1
0 −1 2 −1
0 −1 −1 2

 , D =


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

 . (77)
With such LG and D, we select the state-feedback gains
K1 = diag(4.2, 4.2) for leaderless consensus and K2 =
diag(4.5, 4.5) for leader-follower consensus.
For leaderless consensus, by Theorem 1, we choose γ1 =
0.7 and γ2 = 4.0479. With such parameters, the number of
quantization levels yields 2R + 1 ≥ 20344, which can be
encoded by 15 bits, and the sufficient DoS-bound condition
for consensus is 1/T + ∆/τD < 0.2032. For leader-follower
consensus, according to Theorem 2, we choose γ1 = 0.93
and γ2 = 6. The number of quantization levels must satisfy
2R+1 ≥ 1583 and can be encoded by 11 bits. The DoS-bound
condition for leader-follower consensus is 1/T + ∆/τD <
0.0389. The time responses of δi = [δ
1
i δ
2
i ]
T and δ˜i = [δ˜
1
i δ˜
2
i ]
T
with i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are presented in Figure 1, where the DoS
attacks are present for ∼ 20% of total time in leaderless
consensus and ∼ 3.89% of total time in leader-follower
consensus. One can observe that both the leaderless and leader-
follower consensus are successfully achieved.
In light of the simulations of the two consensus problems
above, comparing with the theoretical tolerable DoS amount of
leaderless consensus, the one for leader-follower consensus is
much smaller. This is more due to the chosen γ1 = 0.93,
which is too close to 1. Actually, for the leader-follower
scenario, one can still preserve consensus when the DoS-
active time accounts for ∼ 5% of total time. If one increases
the amount of DoS attack to ∼ 6%, the state δ˜i diverges.
Meanwhile in all the consensus simulations mentioned above,
the actual quantization output ranges only from −10 to 10
over the simulation horizon 12s. This amounts to the number
of quantization levels no larger than 21, which is much smaller
than their corresponding theoretical values. More surprisingly,
the quantization for the leader state takes only the values −1, 0
and 1 in all the leader-follower simulations mentioned above,
over the simulation horizon 12s.
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Fig. 1. Top: Time response of δi = [δ
1
i
δ2
i
]T in leaderless consensus; Bottom:
Time response of δ˜i = [δ˜
1
i
δ˜2
i
]T in leader-follower consensus.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented results for the leaderless
and leader-follower consensus problems of linear multi-agent
systems with general dynamics under network data rate lim-
itation and malicious DoS attacks. The design of quantized
controller and the characterization of DoS attacks for consen-
sus have been given. In particular, we have provided a feasible
way of designing dynamic quantized control with zooming-
in and zooming-out capabilities for the multi-agent systems
with general dynamics, and such dynamic quantization makes
finite data rate control possible without quantizer overflow
under malicious DoS attacks. We have then characterized the
bound of DoS attacks under which consensus of the multi-
agent systems can be guaranteed. Discussions have been given
on the trade-offs between bit rates and robustness against DoS.
The results in this paper can be extended in various direc-
tions. One possible direction is to implement event-triggered
control to save communication resources in the number of
transmissions [15], [22]. It is also interesting to study the
consensus problem when the multi-agent systems are subject
to local DoS attacks against individual edges.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
In view of the dynamics of α in (28) and ξ in (29), it is
easy to obtain such a form[
α(k +m)
ξ(k +m)
]
=
A¯(m)
γm2
[
α(k)
ξ(k)
]
(78)
where 0 ≤ m ≤ M (in Lemma 1) denotes the number
of consecutive unsuccessful transmissions after k and A¯(m)
is given in (30). If k + m + 1 is an instant of successful
transmission, in view of (26) and (78), one has
α(k +m+ 1) = ([G L ] /γ1)[α
T (k +m) ξT (k +m)]T
= ([G L ] /γ1)(A¯(m)/γ
m
2 )[α
T (k) ξT (k)]T
=
G(m+ 1)
γ1
α(k) +
L(m+ 1)
γ1
ξ(k) (79)
where G(m + 1) and L(m + 1) are given in (31) and (35),
respectively.
It is worth mentioning that (79) is a general form to
incorporate the scenarios of successful and unsuccessful trans-
missions. If m = 0, then in view of (30), A¯11(m) and
A¯22(m) become identity matrices and A¯12(m) and A¯21(m)
are matrices with all zero entries. That is, m = 0 indicates
zero unsuccessful transmission between k and k+1, and hence
(79) is reduced to (26) as a nominal update situation.
Recall the unitary matrix U in (33), where one has
UTLGU = diag(0, λ2, · · · , λN ). It is easy to verify that
(U ⊗ In)T (IN ⊗ A − LG ⊗ BK)(U ⊗ In) = diag(A,A −
λ2BK, · · · , A − λNBK). Wish such U , we introduce the
coordinate transformation below α¯(k) = (U ⊗ In)Tα(k) =[
α¯T1 (k) α¯
T
2 (k)
]T
and ξ¯(km+1) = (U ⊗ In)TL(m+1)ξ(k) =[
ξ¯T1 (km+1) ξ¯
T
2 (km+1)
]T
, where α¯1(k) and ξ¯1(km+1) repre-
sent vectors with the first n elements of α¯(k) and ξ¯(km+1),
respectively. One can verify that α¯1(k) = 0 for all k. Thus,
(79) can be transformed to
α¯(k +m+ 1)
=
G¯(m+ 1)
γ1
α¯(k) +
(Φ⊗ In)TL(m+ 1)
γ1
ξ(k)
=
G¯(m+ 1)
γ1
α¯(k) +
1
γ1
ξ¯(km+1) (80)
where G¯(m+ 1) is given in (32).
Recall that matrix J(m + 1) ∈ Rn(N−1)×n(N−1) (in (34))
denotes the remaining parts of G¯(m + 1) after deleting the
first n rows and columns from G¯(m+1). Then one can obtain
the following equation from (80) such that α¯2(k +m+ 1) =
J(m+1)
γ1
α¯2(k)+
1
γ1
ξ¯2(km+1). Recall that sr denotes the instant
of successful transmissions for r = 0, 1, · · · , and s−1 denotes
k = 0. Thus we have sr = k +m + 1, and sr−1 = k if k is
a successful transmission instant. Hence one has
α¯2(sr) =
J(m+ 1)
γ1
α¯2(sr−1) +
1
γ1
ξ¯2(sr−1m+1). (81)
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Here, we let matrix J¯ = J(m + 1), which is an element in
the set of matrices J in (34). Then (81) is written as
α¯2(sr) =
J¯
γ1
α¯2(sr−1) +
1
γ1
ξ¯2(sr−1m+1) (82)
for r = 0, 1, · · · . By iteration, it is easy to obtain
α¯2(sr) =
(
J¯
γ1
)r+1
α¯2(s−1) +
r−1∑
p=−1
(
J¯
γ1
)r−1−p
ξ¯2(spm+1)
γ1
(83)
In the lemma, we have selected ρ(J(1)) < γ1 < 1 and
θ0 ≥ Cx0γ1/σ. By such θ0, we have ‖α(0)‖ = ‖δ(0)‖/θ0 ≤√
Nn‖δ(0)‖∞/θ0 ≤ 2
√
NnCx0/θ0 ≤ 2
√
Nnσ/γ1 where we
use the fact ‖δ(0)‖∞ ≤ 2Cx0 . By noting that ‖(U ⊗ In)T ‖ =
1, then ‖α¯2(s−1)‖ satisfies
‖α¯2(s−1)‖ = ‖α¯2(0)‖ ≤ ‖α¯(0)‖
≤ ‖(U ⊗ In)T ‖‖α(0)‖ ≤ 2
√
Nnσ/γ1. (84)
Furthermore, one has ‖ξ(s−1)‖∞ = ‖ξ(0)‖∞ ≤
‖(xˆ(0)− x(0))/θ0‖∞ = ‖x(0)/θ0‖∞ ≤ Cx0/θ0 ≤ σ/γ1.
In the lemma, we have assumed that ‖ξ(sp)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 for
p = 0, 1, · · · , r. Incorporating ‖ξ(s−1)‖∞, overall one has
‖ξ(sp)‖∞ ≤ σ/γ1 for p = −1, 0, · · · , r. Hence, we obtain
‖ξ¯2(spm+1)‖ ≤ ‖(U ⊗ In)TL(m+ 1)‖‖ξ(sp)‖
= ‖L(m+ 1)‖‖ξ(sp)‖
≤ C0
√
Nnσ/γ1, p = −1, 0, · · · , r (85)
where C0 is given by (36).
Recall that in the lemma γ1 and γ2 are chosen such
that maxm=1,2,··· ,M ρ(J(m + 1)) ≤ ρ(J(1)) < γ1 < 1,
which implies that ρ(J¯/γ1) ≤ ρ(J(1)/γ1) < 1, then
there exist ρ(J(1)) < d < 1 and C2 ≥ 1 such that∥∥∥(J¯/γ1)k∥∥∥ ≤ C2dk. Substituting (84) and (85) into (83),
we have ‖α¯2(sr)‖ ≤ 2C2
√
Nn σγ1 d
r + C0C2
√
Nnσ
(1−d)γ21
(1− dr) ≤
C1σ/γ1 for r = 0, 1, · · · , where C1 is as in (37). Incorporating
(84), it is obvious that ‖α(sr)‖ ≤ ‖((U⊗In)T )−1‖‖α¯(sr)‖ =
‖α¯2(sr)‖ ≤ C1σ/γ1, r = −1, 0, · · · with the facts that
‖((U ⊗ In)T )−1‖ = 1 and α¯1(k) = 0. Finally, one has
‖[αT (sr) ξT (sr)]T ‖ =
√
‖α(sr)‖2 + ‖ξ(sr)‖2
≤σ
√
C21 +Nn/γ1 (86)
for r = −1, 0, · · · , where ‖ξ(sr)‖ ≤
√
Nn‖ξ(sr)‖∞ ≤√
Nnσ/γ1. 
B. Proof of Lemma 4
In view of (61)–(63), one obtains the vector form as
 β(k)ǫ(k)
ǫ0(k)

 = A˜
γ2

 β(k − 1)ǫ(k − 1)
ǫ0(k − 1)

 (87)
where the matrix A˜ is given in (64). By the iterations of (87),
one has 
 β(k +m)ǫ(k +m)
ǫ0(k +m)

 = A˜(m)
γm2

 β(k)ǫ(k)
ǫ0(k)

 (88)
with m = 0, 1, · · · ,M . The matrix A˜(m) is given in (65). If
a successful transmission occurs at k +m + 1, according to
(58) and (88), one has
β(k +m+ 1)
=
[Π Σ − Φ]
γ1
[
βT (k +m) ǫT (k +m) ǫT0 (k +m)
]T
=
[Π Σ − Φ]
γ1
A˜(m)
γm2
[
βT (k) ǫT (k) ǫT0 (k)
]T
=
P (m+ 1)
γ1
β(k) +
S(m+ 1)
γ1
ǫ(k)− Z(m+ 1)
γ1
ǫ0(k)
(89)
where the matrices P (m+1) = (ΠA˜11(m)+ΣA˜21(m))/γ
m
2 ,
S(m + 1) = (ΠA˜12(m) + ΣA˜22(m))/γ
m
2 and Z(m + 1) =
(ΠA˜13(m) + ΣA˜23(m) − Φ(IN ⊗ Am))/γm2 are given after
(65).
There exists a unitary matrix Ψ˜ such that Ψ˜−1(LG+D)Ψ˜ is
an upper-triangular matrix whose diagonals are the eigenvalues
of the ones of LG +D. With such Φ˜, we obtain the matrices
P˜ (m+ 1) in (66) and
S˜(m+ 1) = (Ψ˜ ⊗ In)TS(m+ 1) (90)
Z˜(m+ 1) = (Ψ˜ ⊗ In)TZ(m+ 1). (91)
In casem = 0, A˜11(0) becomes the identity matrix and A˜21(0)
is a matrix with all zero entries. Then P˜ (m + 1) is reduced
to P˜ (1) = (Ψ˜⊗ In)TP (1)(Ψ˜⊗ In) = (Ψ˜⊗ In)T (ΠA˜11(0)+
ΣA˜21(0))(Ψ˜ ⊗ In) = (Ψ˜ ⊗ In)TΠ(Ψ˜ ⊗ In) as in (68). By
using the transformations β˜(k) = (Ψ˜⊗ In)Tβ(k), ǫ˜(km+1) =
S˜(m+ 1)ǫ(k) and ǫ˜0(km+1) = Z˜(m+ 1)ǫ0(k), the equation
(89) can be rewritten as
β˜(k +m+ 1) =
P˜ (m+ 1)
γ1
β˜(k) +
ǫ˜(km+1)
γ1
− ǫ˜0(km+1)
γ1
.
(92)
Let P˜ denote any matrix in the set of matrices P as
P˜ ∈ P = {P˜ (1), · · · , P˜ (m+ 1), · · · , P˜ (M + 1)}. (93)
When k and k+m+1 are instants of successful transmissions,
by substituting k and k+m+1 with sr−1 and sr, respectively,
(92) can be written as
β˜(sr) =
P˜
γ1
β˜(sr−1) +
(
ǫ˜(sr−1m+1)
γ1
− ǫ˜0(sr−1m+1)
γ1
)
.
(94)
With (94), we conduct the following analysis to obtain
an upper bound of ‖β˜(sr)‖. First we compute ‖β˜(s−1)‖ ≤
2
√
Nnσ/γ1. Then we can derive
‖ǫ˜(sr−1m+1)− ǫ˜0(sr−1m+1)‖
= ‖S˜(m+ 1)ǫ(sr−1)− Z˜(m+ 1)ǫ0(sr−1)‖
= ‖(Ψ˜⊗ In)TS(m+ 1)ǫ(sr−1)
− (Ψ˜⊗ In)TZ(m+ 1)ǫ0(sr−1)‖
≤ ‖S(m+ 1)‖‖ǫ(sr−1)‖+ ‖Z(m+ 1)‖‖ǫ0(sr−1)‖
=
√
NnC˜0σ/γ1 +
√
NnC˜1σ/γ1 =
√
NnC˜2σ/γ1 (95)
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where C˜2 = C˜0+ C˜1 with C˜0 = maxm=0,1,··· ,M ‖S(m+1)‖
and C˜1 = maxm=0,1,··· ,M ‖Z(m+ 1)‖. Since γ1 and γ2 are
chosen such that maxm=1,2,··· ,M ρ(P˜ (m + 1)) ≤ ρ(P˜ (1)) <
γ1 < 1, it follows that ρ(P˜ /γ1) ≤ ρ(P˜ (1)/γ1) < 1. Then
there exist ρ(P˜ (1)) < d˜ < 1 and C˜4 ≥ 1 such that∥∥∥∥(P˜ /γ1)k
∥∥∥∥ ≤ C˜4d˜k. (96)
In view of (94) and following the very similar calculation as in
the proof of Lemma 3, one has ‖β˜(sr)‖ ≤ C˜3σ/γ1 with C˜3 in
(69) and furthermore ‖β(sr)‖ ≤ ‖((Ψ˜⊗ In)T )−1‖‖β˜(sr)‖ ≤
C˜3σ/γ1. Moreover, we also have ‖ǫ(sr)‖ ≤
√
Nn‖ǫ(sr)‖∞ ≤√
Nnσ/γ1 and similarly ‖ǫ0(sr)‖ ≤
√
Nnσ/γ1. Eventually,
one has
‖[βT (sr) ǫT (sr) ǫT0 (sr)]‖T ≤
√
C˜23σ
2/γ21 + 2Nnσ
2/γ21
for r = −1, 0, · · · , and obtains the desired result (72). 
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